

Pairing-Based Onion Routing with Improved Forward Secrecy

ANIKET KATE, GREG M. ZAVERUCHA, and IAN GOLDBERG
University of Waterloo

29

This article presents new protocols for onion routing anonymity networks. We define a provably secure privacy-preserving key agreement scheme in an identity-based infrastructure setting, and use it to design new onion routing circuit constructions. These constructions, based on a user's selection, offer immediate or eventual forward secrecy at each node in a circuit and require significantly less computation and communication than the telescoping mechanism used by the Tor project. Further, the use of an identity-based infrastructure also leads to a reduction in the required amount of authenticated directory information. Therefore, our constructions provide practical ways to allow onion routing anonymity networks to scale gracefully.

Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.6 [**Computer-Communication Networks**]: Networking; C.2.4 [**Computer-Communication Networks**]: Distributed Systems—*Distributed applications*; E.3 [**Data**]: Data Encryption—*Public key cryptosystems*

General Terms: Design, Performance, Security

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Onion routing, Tor, pairing-based cryptography, anonymous key agreement, forward secrecy

ACM Reference Format:

Kate, A., Zaverucha, G. M., and Goldberg, I. 2010. Pairing-based onion routing with improved forward secrecy. *ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur.* 13, 4, Article 29 (December 2010), 32 pages. DOI = 10.1145/1880022.1880023. <http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1880022.1880023>.

1. INTRODUCTION

Over the years, a large number of anonymity networks have been proposed and some have been implemented. Common to many of them is *onion routing*

The authors of this work were supported in part by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, the Mathematics of Information Technology and Complex Systems Network of Centres of Excellence, and David R. Cheriton Graduate Scholarships.

Authors' address: A. Kate, G. M. Zaverucha, and I. Goldberg, David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo, 200 University Ave. West, Waterloo, ON, Canada N2L 3G1; email: {akate, gzaveruc, iang}@cs.uwaterloo.ca.

Permission to make digital or hard copies part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies show this notice on the first page or initial screen of a display along with the full citation. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers, to redistribute to lists, or to use any component of this work in other works requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Permissions may be requested from the Publications Dept., ACM, Inc., 2 Penn Plaza, Suite 701, New York, NY 10121-0701 USA, fax +1 (212) 869-0481, or permissions@acm.org. © 2010 ACM 1094-9224/2010/12-ART29 \$10.00 DOI: 10.1145/1880022.1880023. <http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1880022.1880023>.

ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, Vol. 13, No. 4, Article 29, Pub. date: December 2010.

[Reed et al. 1998], a technique whereby a message is wrapped in multiple layers of encryption, forming an *onion*. As the message is delivered via a number of intermediate *onion routers* (abbreviated ORs, also called *hops* or *nodes*), each node decrypts one of the layers, and forwards the message to the next node. This idea goes back to Chaum [1981] and has been used to build both low- and high-latency communication networks.

A common realization of an onion routing system is to arrange a collection of nodes that will relay traffic for users of the system. Users then randomly choose a path through the network of onion routers and construct a *circuit*: a sequence of nodes which will route traffic. After the circuit is constructed, each of the nodes in the circuit shares a symmetric key with the user, which will be used to encrypt the layers of future onions.

Pairing-based cryptography (see Koblitz and Menezes [2005] for a detailed discussion) has drawn an overwhelming amount of research attention in the last few years. In one of the pioneering works in the field, Sakai et al. [2000] presented a noninteractive key agreement scheme in the identity-based setting. In this article, we enhance their protocol to develop provably secure one- or two-way (also referred to as unilateral or bilateral) privacy-preserving authentication and key agreement schemes. After one-way authentication between Alice (who will remain anonymous) and Bob (who is to be authenticated), Alice has confirmed Bob's identity and Bob learns nothing about Alice, except perhaps that she is a valid user of a particular system. In a two-way scheme, each user can confirm the other is a valid user without learning who the other is.

We then use our one-way anonymous key agreement protocol to build onion routing circuits for anonymity networks like Tor [Dingledine et al. 2004] and prove security-related properties of the new construction. Our protocol, which first appeared in Kate et al. [2007a], constructs a circuit in a single pass and also provides a practical way to achieve eventual forward secrecy. Observing the performance trade-off between immediate and eventual forward secrecy in onion routing circuit construction, we also develop a λ -pass circuit construction, which obtains immediate forward secrecy at λ nodes by incorporating λ single-pass circuit constructions. The performance of our circuit construction protocols surpass that of Tor, requiring significantly less computation and fewer network communications. Further, they do not require the public keys of onion routers to be authenticated and consequently, reduce the load on directory servers which improves the scalability of anonymity networks.

Previous work related to pairing-based key exchange, as well as to anonymity networks, is covered in Section 2. We describe the cryptographic protocols in Section 3, and an onion routing system built with a Boneh-Franklin identity-based infrastructure in Section 4. In Section 5, we present our λ -pass circuit construction and prove some security properties of our onion routing circuit constructions in Section 6. Some of the more practical issues in such a system are discussed in Section 7 and we compare our computational and communication costs to those of Tor in Section 8.

2. RELATED WORK

The concept of onion routing plays a key role in many efforts to provide anonymous communication [Dai 1998; Dingledine et al. 2004; Freedman and Morris 2002; Reed et al. 1998; Rennhard and Plattner 2002] while a number of other papers discuss formalizations and the security of onion routing [Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2005; Mauw et al. 2004; Möller 2003; Syverson et al. 2000]. To date, the largest onion routing system is Tor, which has approximately 1000 onion routers and hundreds of thousands of users [Tor Project 2008]. These numbers (and their growth) underscore the demand for anonymity online.

In the original Onion Routing project [Goldschlag et al. 1996; Reed et al. 1998; Syverson et al. 2000] (which was superseded by Tor) circuit construction was done as follows. The user created an onion where each layer contained the symmetric key for one node and the location of the next node, all encrypted with the original node's public key. Each node decrypts a layer, keeps the symmetric key, and forwards the rest of the onion along to the next node. The main drawback of this approach is that it does not provide forward secrecy (as defined in Dingledine et al. [2004]). Suppose a circuit is constructed from the user to the sequence of nodes $A \Leftrightarrow B \Leftrightarrow C$, and that A is malicious. If A records the traffic, and at an arbitrary time in the future compromises B (at which point he learns the next hop is C), and then compromises C , the complete route is known, and A learns who the user has communicated with. A possible fix for this problem is to frequently change the public keys of each node. This limits the amount of time A has to compromise B and C , but requires that the users of the system frequently contact the directory server to retrieve authentic keys.

Later systems constructed circuits incrementally and interactively (this process is sometimes called *telescoping*). The idea is to use the node's public key only to initiate a communication during which a temporary session key is established via the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Tor constructs circuits in this way, using the Tor Authentication Protocol (TAP). TAP is described and proven secure in Goldberg [2006].

Trade-offs exist between the two methods of constructing circuits. Forward secrecy is the main advantage of telescoping, but telescoping also handles nodes that are not accepting connections; if the third node is down during the construction of a circuit, for example, the first two remain, and the user only needs to choose an alternate third. Information about the status and availability of nodes is therefore less important. The drawback of telescoping is cost; establishing a circuit of length ℓ requires $O(\ell^2)$ network communications, and $O(\ell^2)$ symmetric encryptions/decryptions.

Øverlier and Syverson [2007] improve the efficiency of telescoping-based circuit construction using a half-certified Diffie-Hellman key exchange [Menezes et al. 1997, Section 12.6]. They further define an efficient single-pass circuit construction and a few variants. The proposed variants offer different levels of forward secrecy, which are traded off against computation and communication. For example, their eventual forward secret variants use frequent rotation of nodes' public keys, presenting the same issues as in first-generation

onion routing; their immediate forward secrecy variant uses the same amount of communication as the current Tor ($O(\ell^2)$), but less computation.

In related efforts, Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [2005] formally define the requirements of a secure onion routing construction in the Universal Composability (UC) framework [Canetti 2001] and present a generic construction of onion routing circuits. Although formally secure, their construction is less efficient than other constructions due to the additional mechanisms required to prove security in the UC framework. While no attacks are known when these mechanisms are removed, the proof no longer holds. Forward secrecy may be provided by using a forward secret CCA2-secure cryptosystem such as Canetti et al. [2007].

The work of Okamoto and Okamoto [2005] presents schemes for anonymous authentication and key agreement. In Rahman et al. [2006], an anonymous authentication protocol is presented as part of an anonymous communication system for mobile ad hoc networks. The protocols in both papers are complex, and limited motivation is given for design choices. Further, both papers neglect to discuss the security of their proposed protocols. The protocols we present in Section 3.2 are a great deal simpler than previous protocols. This allows them to be more easily understood, and simplifies the discussion of their security, which appears in Section 3.3. A recent article [Huang 2007] presents a pseudonym-based encryption scheme similar to our anonymous key agreement protocol in Section 3.2, but differs in its method of private-key extraction as well as in the motivation behind its use.

All these protocols owe a lot to the noninteractive key exchange protocol of Sakai et al. [2000]. In the next section, we will review their scheme after covering relevant background material.

3. PAIRING-BASED KEY AGREEMENT WITH USER ANONYMITY

In one of the pioneering works of pairing-based cryptography, Sakai et al. suggested an identity-based noninteractive key agreement scheme using bilinear pairings [Sakai et al. 2000]. In this section, we extend this key agreement scheme. We replace the identities of the participants by pseudonyms. The resulting scheme provides unconditional anonymity to participating users.

3.1 Preliminaries

We briefly review bilinear pairings and the original noninteractive key agreement scheme of Sakai et al. [2000]. For a detailed presentation of pairings and cryptographic applications thereof, see Blake et al. [2005] and references therein.

3.1.1 Bilinear Pairings. Consider two additive cyclic groups \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 and a multiplicative cyclic group \mathbb{G}_T , all of the same prime order n . A bilinear map e is a map $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ with the following properties.

- (1) *Bilinearity.* For all $P \in \mathbb{G}_1$, $Q \in \mathbb{G}_2$ and $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, $e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)^{ab}$.
- (2) *Nondegeneracy.* The map does not send all pairs in $\mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2$ to unity in \mathbb{G}_T .

- (3) *Computability.* There is an efficient algorithm to compute $e(P, Q)$ for any $P \in \mathbb{G}_1$ and $Q \in \mathbb{G}_2$.

Our protocols, like many pairing-based cryptographic protocols, use a special form of bilinear map called a *symmetric pairing* where $\mathbb{G}_1 = \mathbb{G}_2$. For such pairings $e(P, Q) = e(Q, P)$ for any $P, Q \in \mathbb{G}_1$. The modified Weil pairing over elliptic curve groups [Verheul 2001] is an example of a symmetric bilinear pairing. In the rest of the article, all bilinear pairings are symmetric, and we denote $\mathbb{G}_1 = \mathbb{G}_2$ by \mathbb{G} .

3.1.2 The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption. Using the preceding notation, the *Bilinear Diffie-Hellman* (BDH) problem is to compute $e(P, P)^{abc} \in \mathbb{G}_T$ given a generator P of \mathbb{G} and elements aP, bP, cP for $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$. An equivalent formulation of the problem is to compute $e(A, B)^c$ given a generator P of \mathbb{G} , and elements A, B , and cP in \mathbb{G} .

An algorithm \mathcal{A} has *advantage* $\epsilon(\kappa)$ in solving the BDH problem for $\langle n, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e \rangle$, where κ is the bitlength of n , if $\Pr[\mathcal{A}(k, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, A, B, cP) = e(A, B)^c] \geq \epsilon(\kappa)$. As usual, for the security parameter κ , a function $\eta(\cdot)$ is called *negligible* if for all $c > 0$ there exists a κ_0 such that $\eta(\kappa) < 1/\kappa^c$ for all $\kappa > \kappa_0$. If for every polynomial-time (in κ) algorithm to solve the BDH problem on $\langle n, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e \rangle$, the advantage $\epsilon(\kappa)$ is a negligible function, then $\langle n, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e \rangle$ is said to satisfy the *BDH assumption*.

3.1.3 Boneh-Franklin Setup and Noninteractive Key Agreement. In a Boneh-Franklin Identity-Based Encryption (BF-IBE) setup [Boneh and Franklin 2001], a trusted authority, called a Private Key Generator (PKG), generates private keys (d_i) for clients using the clients' well-known identities (ID_i) and a master secret s . A client with identity ID_i receives the private key $d_i = sH(ID_i) \in \mathbb{G}$, where $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}^*$ is a full-domain cryptographic hash function and \mathbb{G}^* denotes the set of all elements in \mathbb{G} except the identity.

Sakai et al. [2000] observed that, with such a setup, any two clients of the same PKG can compute a shared key using only the identity of the other participant and their own private keys. Only the two clients and the PKG can compute this key. For two clients with identities ID_A and ID_B , the shared key is given by $K_{A,B} = e(Q_A, Q_B)^s = e(Q_A, d_B) = e(d_A, Q_B)$ where $Q_A = H(ID_A)$ and $Q_B = H(ID_B)$.

Dupont and Enge [2006] proved that this protocol is secure in the random oracle model assuming the BDH problem in $\langle n, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e \rangle$ is hard.

3.2 Anonymous Key Agreement

We observe that by replacing the identity hashes with pseudonyms generated by users, a key agreement protocol with unconditional anonymity is possible. In our protocol, each participant can confirm that the other participant is a client of the same PKG, but cannot determine his identity. Each client can, on her own, randomly generate many possible pseudonyms and the corresponding private keys.

Suppose Alice, with (identity, private key) pair (ID_A, d_A) , is seeking anonymity. She generates a random number $r_A \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ and creates the pseudonym and corresponding private key $(P_A = r_A Q_A = r_A H(ID_A), r_A d_A = sP_A)$. In a key agreement protocol, she sends the pseudonym P_A instead of her actual identity to another participating client, who may or may not be anonymous. For two participants (say Alice and Bob) with pseudonyms P_A and P_B , the shared session key is given as

$$K_{A,B} = e(P_A, P_B)^s = e(Q_A, Q_B)^{r_A r_B s},$$

where r_A and r_B are random numbers generated respectively by Alice and Bob. If Bob does not wish to be anonymous, he can just use $r_B = 1$ instead of a random value, resulting in $P_B = Q_B$. If persistent pseudonymity is desired instead of anonymity, the random values can easily be reused.

Two participants can perform a session key agreement by exchanging pseudonyms. Further, two participants can also perform an authenticated key agreement by modifying any secure symmetric-key-based mutual authentication protocol and simply replacing their identities by their pseudonyms.

3.2.1 One-Way Anonymous Key Agreement. Anonymous communication often requires anonymity for just one of the participants; the other participant works as a nonanonymous service provider and the anonymous participant needs to confirm the service provider's identity. In the key agreement protocol, the service provider uses her actual identity rather than a pseudonym. Further, in this one-way anonymity setting two participants can agree on a session key in a noninteractive manner. A noninteractive scheme to achieve this is defined next.

Suppose Alice and Bob are clients of a PKG. As before, Alice has identity ID_A and private key $d_A = sQ_A = sH(ID_A)$. Alice wishes to remain anonymous to Bob, but she knows Bob's identity ID_B .

- (1) Alice computes $Q_B = H(ID_B)$. She chooses a random integer $r_A \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$, generates the corresponding pseudonym $P_A = r_A Q_A$ and private key $r_A d_A = sP_A$, and computes the session key $K_{A,B} = e(sP_A, Q_B) = e(Q_A, Q_B)^{sr_A}$. She sends her pseudonym P_A to Bob.
- (2) Bob, using P_A and his private key d_B , computes the session key $K_{A,B} = e(P_A, d_B) = e(Q_A, Q_B)^{sr_A}$.

Note that in step 1, Alice can also include a message for Bob symmetrically encrypted with the session key; we will use this in Section 4. Note also that in practice, the session key is often derived from $K_{A,B}$, and is not just $K_{A,B}$ itself.

3.2.2 Key Authentication and Confirmation. In most one-way anonymous communication situations, it is also required to authenticate the nonanonymous service provider. With the noninteractive protocols of this section, the key is implicitly authenticated; Alice is assured that only Bob can compute the key. If Alice must be sure Bob has in fact computed the key, explicit key confirmation can be achieved by incorporating any symmetric-key-based challenge-response protocol.

3.3 Security and Anonymity

In this section, we discuss the security and anonymity of our key agreement schemes in the random oracle model.

For the security parameter κ , we consider a problem to be *infeasible*, if for any polynomial-time (in κ) algorithm to solve it, the advantage $\epsilon(\kappa)$ is a negligible function. On the other hand, we consider a problem to be *impossible*, if for any algorithm to solve it with unbounded space and time complexity, the advantage $\epsilon(\kappa)$ is a negligible function.

Based on these definitions, we make the following claims.

Unconditional Anonymity. It is impossible for the other participant in a protocol run, the PKG, or any third party to learn the identity of an anonymous participant in a protocol run.

Session Key Secrecy. It is infeasible for anyone other than the two participants or the PKG to determine a session key generated during a protocol run.

No Impersonation. It is infeasible for a malicious client of the PKG to impersonate another (nonanonymous) client in a protocol run. In the case of persistent pseudonymity, it is not feasible for a malicious entity to communicate using a different entity's pseudonym.

Next, we prove each of our claims.

3.3.1 Unconditional Anonymity. Here, we prove that it is impossible for an adversary \mathcal{A} to learn the identity of an anonymous participant in a protocol run. For ease of comprehension, we first briefly discuss it in an informal manner. For an anonymous client with identity ID_A , the pseudonym $P_A = r_A Q_A \in \mathbb{G}$ is the only parameter exchanged during the protocol that is derived from her identity. Because \mathbb{G} is a cyclic group of prime order, Q_A is a generator, so multiplying by the random r_A blinds the underlying identity from the adversary \mathcal{A} , which can be the other participant in the protocol run, the PKG for the system, or any third party. To formalize our proof, we consider the following game between an adversary and a challenger.

Setup. The adversary \mathcal{A} publishes the system parameters: a cyclic additive group \mathbb{G} of prime order n (which has bitlength κ) and a hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}^*$.

Challenge. \mathcal{A} chooses two identity strings ID_A and ID_B and sends them to the challenger. The challenger computes $Q_A = H(ID_A)$ and $Q_B = H(ID_B)$. He then uniformly at random chooses $r \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ and $b \in \{0, 1\}$, then

- (1) if $b = 0$, computes a pseudonym $P = rQ_A$ or
- (2) if $b = 1$, computes a pseudonym $P = rQ_B$

and sends P to \mathcal{A} .

Guess. \mathcal{A} wins the game if she can guess the correct value of b with probability $1/2 + \epsilon(\kappa)$ for a nonnegligible function ϵ .

As \mathbb{G} is a cyclic prime order group, both Q_A and Q_B are generators of \mathbb{G} . For the uniform random element $r \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$, the pseudonym P equal to rQ_A or rQ_B is also a uniform random element of \mathbb{G}^* . Therefore, an attacker cannot determine which of the two ways the challenger generated P and consequently cannot guess the value of b with probability greater than $1/2$ to win this game. The inability of the attacker to win this game for system parameters of their choosing, even with unbounded computation power, proves our unconditional anonymity claim.

3.3.2 Session Key Secrecy. Dupont and Enge [2006] prove the security of the key agreement scheme of Sakai et al. [2000] in the random oracle model using an analysis technique by Coron [2000]. According to their proof, an attacker cannot compute the shared key if the BDH assumption holds on $\langle n, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, e \rangle$, and H is modeled by a random oracle. Here, we modify their proof to prove that it is infeasible for anyone other than the two participants or the PKG to determine a session key generated during a protocol run of the one-way or two-way anonymous key agreement.

Consider the following game to prove key secrecy in the one-way anonymous case.

Setup. The challenger generates groups \mathbb{G} and \mathbb{G}_T of prime order n , a cryptographic hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}^*$, a symmetric bilinear pairing $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \mapsto \mathbb{G}_T$, and a master secret $s \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$.

Extraction Queries. The adversary \mathcal{A}_1 issues q extraction queries for identities ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_q to the challenger. The challenger queries H to compute the corresponding private keys $sH(ID_1), sH(ID_2), \dots, sH(ID_q)$ and sends them back to \mathcal{A}_1 .

Challenge. Once \mathcal{A}_1 informs the challenger that it has collected enough information, the challenger picks an element $P_A \in \mathbb{G}^*$ and sends it to \mathcal{A}_1 .

Guess. \mathcal{A}_1 outputs a binary string (an identity) ID_B and $K_{A,B} \in \mathbb{G}_T$.

The attacker's advantage can be defined as

$$\text{Adv}(\mathcal{A}_1) = \Pr[e(P_A, H(ID_B))^s = K_{A,B}].$$

We say \mathcal{A}_1 (t_1, ϵ_1) -wins the game, if it runs in time at most t_1 and has advantage ϵ_1 .

Next, consider the following game to prove key secrecy in the two-way anonymous case.

Setup. The challenger generates groups \mathbb{G} and \mathbb{G}_T of order n , a cryptographic hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}^*$, a symmetric bilinear pairing $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \mapsto \mathbb{G}_T$, and a master secret $s \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$.

Extraction Queries. The adversary \mathcal{A}_2 issues q extraction queries for identities $ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_q \in \mathbb{G}$ to the challenger. The challenger queries H to compute the corresponding private keys $sH(ID_1), sH(ID_2), \dots, sH(ID_q)$ and sends them back to \mathcal{A}_2 .

Challenge. Once \mathcal{A}_2 informs the challenger that it has collected enough information, the challenger picks two elements P_A and P_B in \mathbb{G}^* and sends them to \mathcal{A}_2 .

Guess. \mathcal{A}_2 outputs $K_{A,B} \in \mathbb{G}_T$.

The attacker's advantage can be defined as

$$\text{Adv}(\mathcal{A}_2) = \Pr[e(P_A, P_B)^s = K_{A,B}].$$

We say \mathcal{A}_2 (t_2, ϵ_2) -wins the game, if it runs in time at most t_2 and has advantage ϵ_2 .

Suppose that there is an adversary \mathcal{A}_1 who (t_1, ϵ_1) -wins the one-way anonymous game and an adversary \mathcal{A}_2 who (t_2, ϵ_2) -wins the two-way anonymous game. We now show that an algorithm \mathcal{B} can make use of \mathcal{A}_1 or \mathcal{A}_2 to solve a random instance of the BDH problem.

THEOREM 1. *Let the hash function H be modeled by a random oracle. Suppose there exist adversaries \mathcal{A}_1 and \mathcal{A}_2 such that \mathcal{A}_1 (t_1, ϵ_1) -wins the one-way anonymous protocol security game and \mathcal{A}_2 (t_2, ϵ_2) -wins the two-way anonymous protocol security game. Then there exists an algorithm \mathcal{B} which solves the BDH problem:*

- using \mathcal{A}_1 with probability $\frac{\epsilon_1}{e(1+q)}$ in time $t_1 + wq + t_T + t_{inv}$ or
- using \mathcal{A}_2 with probability ϵ_2 in time $t_2 + wq$.

Here e is the base of natural logarithms, w is a small constant, q is an upper bound on the number of extraction queries performed by an adversary, t_T is the time required for exponentiation in \mathbb{G}_T , and t_{inv} is the time required to invert an element of \mathbb{Z}_n^* .

PROOF. Let $(P, aP, bP, cP) \in \mathbb{G}$ be a random and uniformly distributed instance of the BDH problem, which algorithm \mathcal{B} receives as input. To find the solution $e(P, P)^{abc}$, \mathcal{B} simulates the challenger for \mathcal{A}_1 or \mathcal{A}_2 . This means that \mathcal{B} must simulate the random oracle H and answer the private key extraction queries by \mathcal{A}_1 or \mathcal{A}_2 . As the steps for H -queries and extraction queries are the same in both \mathcal{A}_1 or \mathcal{A}_2 , we denote both of them by \mathcal{A} .

H-queries. At any time, \mathcal{A} can query the random oracle H . To respond to these queries, \mathcal{B} maintains an initially empty list L of quadruples $(X, Q, h, \beta) \in \{0, 1\}^* \times \mathbb{G}^* \times \mathbb{Z}_n^* \times \{0, 1\}$. When \mathcal{A} queries for the hash value of some bit-string X_i , algorithm \mathcal{B} responds as follows.

- (1) If L contains a quadruple (X_i, Q_i, h_i, β_i) , \mathcal{B} responds by sending Q_i .
- (2) Otherwise, \mathcal{B} generates at random $\beta_i \in \{0, 1\}$, so that $\Pr[\beta_i = 0] = \delta$, where δ depends on \mathcal{B} 's choice for the attacker (\mathcal{A}_1 or \mathcal{A}_2) and will be determined shortly.

- (3) Algorithm \mathcal{B} picks a random $h_i \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$. If $\beta_i = 0$, set $Q_i = h_i P$, else set $Q_i = h_i(bP)$. Note that either way, Q_i is uniformly random in \mathbb{G}^* and independent of \mathcal{A} 's current view.
- (4) Finally, algorithm \mathcal{B} adds the quadruple (X_i, Q_i, h_i, β_i) to the list L and responds with Q_i .

Extraction queries. \mathcal{A} can ask for extraction queries for identity strings. For an input string ID_i for private key extraction, \mathcal{B} responds as follows.

- (1) Algorithm \mathcal{B} runs the aforesaid H -query algorithm for input $X_i = ID_i$ to obtain $(ID_i, Q_i, h_i, \beta_i)$.
- (2) If $\beta_i = 1$ then \mathcal{B} reports failure.
- (3) Otherwise, \mathcal{B} computes the private key $h_i(cP) = cQ_i$ and sends it to algorithm \mathcal{A} .

Challenge. After completing the extraction queries, \mathcal{B} challenges \mathcal{A}_1 with $P_A = aP$ or \mathcal{A}_2 with $P_A = aP$ and $P_B = bP$.

Guess. \mathcal{A}_1 outputs $(ID_B, K_{A,B}) \in \{0, 1\}^* \times \mathbb{G}_T$ or \mathcal{A}_2 outputs $K_{A,B} \in \mathbb{G}_T$. In the case of adversary \mathcal{A}_2 , \mathcal{B} outputs $\sigma = K_{A,B}$ as its guess for the solution to the BDH problem. For the adversary \mathcal{A}_1 , algorithm \mathcal{B} performs following steps.

- (1) \mathcal{B} obtains the quadruple $(ID_B, Q_B, h_B, \beta_B)$ from the list L . Absence of the quadruple $(ID_B, Q_B, h_B, \beta_B)$ in the list L indicates that \mathcal{A}_1 did not ask the random oracle for $H(ID_B)$. As the probability of the adversary's success in this case is negligible,¹ we safely assume the presence of the quadruple (ID_B, Q_B, h_B, c_B) .
- (2) If $\beta_B = 1$, \mathcal{B} outputs $\sigma = K_{A,B}^{h_B^{-1}}$ as its guess for the BDH instance.
- (3) If $\beta_B = 0$, \mathcal{B} reports failure.

Suppose that \mathcal{B} does not report failure and outputs σ while using \mathcal{A}_1 . As $\beta_B = 1$, $H(ID_B) = h_B(bP)$ and with probability ϵ_1 , $\sigma = e(aP, h_B(bP))^{ch_B^{-1}} = e(P, P)^{abc}$. Therefore \mathcal{B} will guess correctly with probability ϵ_1 , when it does not abort. The probability that \mathcal{B} does not abort while extracting a single private key query is δ ; for q queries, the probability is δ^q . The probability that \mathcal{B} does not abort while guessing the BDH solution is $1 - \delta$. Therefore, the overall probability of nonabortion is $\delta^q(1 - \delta)$. Maximizing this probability, the optimal value can be obtained at $\delta = \frac{q}{1+q}$ and by choosing the value of δ optimally, the overall probability of nonabortion is $\frac{q^q}{(1+q)^{q+1}}$. Therefore, \mathcal{B} outputs the correct solution to the BDH instance with probability at least $\frac{\epsilon_1 q^q}{(1+q)^{q+1}} \geq \frac{1}{e(1+q)}$ as $(1 - \frac{1}{q+1})^q \geq 1/e$. The solution is computed in time $t_1 + wq + t_T + t_{inv}$, where t_1 is the time required by \mathcal{A} , w is the time required to answer an extraction query (generate a random element r and compute the r th multiple of cP), q is an upper bound on the

¹If \mathcal{A}_1 does not query the random oracle for $H(ID_B)$, the probability it can guess this value is negligible. As there is a bijection between x and $e(P_A, x)$ for a given P_A , the probability that \mathcal{A}_1 can output $K_{A,B} = e(P_A, H(ID_B))$ is also negligible. Thus, \mathcal{A}_1 's advantage in this case is negligible.

number of such queries, and $t_T + t_{inv}$ is the time to invert an element of \mathbb{Z}_n^* and to compute an exponentiation of $K_{A,B} \in \mathbb{G}_T$ in the guessing phase.

For adversary \mathcal{A}_2 , we simply set the value of δ to 1. Suppose that \mathcal{B} does not report failure and outputs σ while using \mathcal{A}_2 . With probability ϵ_2 , $\sigma = e(aP, bP)^c = e(P, P)^{abc}$, which is the correct solution to the BDH problem. The solution is computed in time $t_2 + wq$. \square

Note that it is possible to prove the security of the two-way anonymous key agreement protocol without random oracles, if we do not consider the query extraction phase. Assume that only one identity hash and private key pair (U, sU) is publicly available and each user uses the same pair to generate a pseudonym and corresponding private key. Given an adversary \mathcal{A} to (t, ϵ) -compute $K_{A,B} = e(P_A, P_B)^s$ when challenged by P_A and P_B , a random instance (P, aP, bP, cP) of the BDH problem can be solved in time t with probability ϵ by publishing (P, cP) as the publicly available identity hash and private key and challenging \mathcal{A} with $P_A = aP$ and $P_B = bP$.

3.3.3 No Impersonation. We claim that it is infeasible for a malicious client of the PKG to impersonate another (nonanonymous) client in a protocol run. To successfully impersonate a nonanonymous participant ID_N in our one-way anonymous key agreement protocol, given a pseudonym and ID_N , an adversary needs to determine the corresponding session key. We observe that the adversary game for nonanonymous participant impersonation is the same as the key secrecy game of the one-way anonymous key agreement in Section 3.3.2 and consequently the corresponding theorem and proof carry over.

In the case of persistent pseudonymity, we claim that it is not feasible for a malicious entity to communicate using a different entity's pseudonym. Here, the malicious entity needs to find the shared secret key for a persistent pseudonym generated and used by some other anonymous entity and an arbitrary identity or pseudonym for which it does not know the private key. In the one-way anonymous communication protocol, the corresponding adversary game remains the same as that for impersonation of the nonanonymous entity, and in the two-way anonymous case, the game is the same as the one used to prove key secrecy. Consequently, the theorem and proof for the corresponding game are same as those used to prove key secrecy in Section 3.3.2.

3.4 Distributed PKG

The PKG in the BF-IBE framework, with the master key, has the power to decrypt all messages encrypted for clients. As our schemes use the same setup as BF-IBE, the PKG can compute a session key from the publicly available pseudonyms and the master key s . Due to this, compromise of the PKG is a single point of failure for security.

Boneh and Franklin [2001] suggest the use of a distributed PKG instead a single PKG to mitigate this problem. Their distributed PKG uses t out of m Shamir secret sharing [Shamir 1979], which involves distributing the master key information among m PKGs, such that any $t + 1$ of them, but no fewer, can compute the master key or generate a private key for a client. Instead of this

basic arrangement, we suggest use of a verifiable and proactively secure distributed PKG over the Internet [Kate and Goldberg 2007], where a master key is generated in a completely distributed way with each of m PKGs contributing a random share. The distributed design is additionally more robust; at any given time only $t + 1$ of the m PKGs must be online in order for a client to retrieve his private key.

3.5 Applications of Our Anonymity Schemes

Our anonymous key agreement schemes can be used to perform anonymous communication in any setting having a BF-IBE setup. In recent years, numerous BF-IBE-based solutions have been suggested for various practical situations such as ad hoc networks [Chien and Lin 2006; Khalili et al. 2003; Seth and Keshav 2005]. Our anonymous key agreement schemes can be used in all of these setups without any extra effort. As an example, we refer readers to the secure anonymous communication scheme for delay-tolerant networks [Kate et al. 2007b]. In the present article, we focus on a new pairing-based onion routing protocol which achieves forward secrecy and constructs circuits without telescoping. We describe this protocol in the next section.

4. PAIRING-BASED ONION ROUTING

Low-latency onion routing requires one-way anonymous key agreement and forward secrecy. In this section, we describe a new pairing-based onion routing protocol using the noninteractive key agreement scheme defined in Section 3.2.

Our onion routing protocol has a significant advantage over the original onion routing protocol [Goldschlag et al. 1996] as well as the protocol used in Tor [Dingledine et al. 2004]; it provides a practical way to achieve forward secrecy without building circuits by telescoping. Though this is possible with the original onion routing protocol, that method involves regularly communicating authenticated copies of onion routers' (ORs') public keys to the system users; forward secrecy is achieved by periodically rotating these keys. This does not scale well; every time the public keys are changed *all* users must contact a directory server to retrieve the new authenticated keys. However, our onion routing protocol uses ORs' identities, which users can obtain or derive without repeatedly contacting a central server, thus providing practical forward secrecy without telescoping.

4.1 Design Goals and Threat Model

As our protocol only differs from existing onion routing protocols in the circuit construction phase, our threat model is that of Tor. For example, adversaries have complete control over some part (but not all) of the network, as well as control over some of the nodes themselves.

We aim at frustrating attackers from linking multiple communications to or from a single user. Like Tor, we do not try to develop a system secure against a global observer, which can in theory follow end-to-end traffic. Further, it should

not be feasible for any node to determine the identity of any node in a circuit other than its two adjacent nodes. Finally, we require forward secrecy: after some amount of time, the session keys used to protect node identities and the contents of messages are irrecoverable, even if all participants in the network are subsequently compromised.

4.2 Pairing-Based Onion Routing Protocol

An onion routing protocol involves a service provider, a set of onion routers, and users. In our protocol, a user does not build the circuit incrementally via telescoping, but rather in a single pass. The user chooses ℓ ORs from the available pool and generates separate pseudonyms for communicating with each of them. The user computes the corresponding session keys and uses them to construct a message with ℓ nested layers of encryption. This process uses the protocol given in Section 3.2 ℓ times.

The service provider works as the PKG for the ORs and provides private keys for their identities.

4.2.1 Forward Secrecy. There are two time-scale parameters in our protocol: the *master key validity period* (VP_{MK}) and the *private key validity period* (VP_{PK}). Both of these values relate to the forward secrecy of the system. The VP_{PK} specifies how much exposure time a circuit has against compromises of the ORs that use it. That is, until the VP_{PK} elapses, the ORs have enough information to collectively decrypt circuit construction onions sent during that VP_{PK} . After each VP_{PK} , ORs discard their current private keys and obtain new keys from the PKGs. This period can be short, perhaps on the order of an hour.

The VP_{MK} specifies the circuit's exposure time against compromises of the (distributed) PKG which reveal the master secret s . Because changing s involves the participation of all of the ORs as well as the PKGs, we suggest the VP_{MK} be somewhat longer than the VP_{PK} , perhaps on the order of a day.² Remember that in the t of m distributed PKG, if at least $m - t$ PKG members are honest and not compromised, no one will ever learn the value of a master secret.

4.2.2 Protocol Description. As discussed before, we propose the use of a distributed PKG, but for simplicity, our discussion will consider the PKG to be a single entity. Using a distributed PKG affects only the setup and key generation steps.

Setup. Given the security requirements, the PKG generates a digital signature key pair (for any secure digital signature scheme). It also generates a prime n , two groups \mathbb{G} (written additively) and \mathbb{G}_T (written multiplicatively) of order n and a bilinear map $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$. Finally, the PKG chooses a full-domain cryptographic hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}^*$. The PKG publishes all of these values except its private signature key.

²Note that VP_{MK} and VP_{PK} both are deployment parameters and do not affect the security analysis.

Key Generation. During the key generation step, the PKG performs following steps.

- (1) For each VP_{MK} , the PKG generates a random master key $s \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ and a random $U \in \mathbb{G}$, and calculates sU . The PKG publishes a signed copy of (v_m, U, sU) , where v_m is a timestamp for the VP_{MK} in question. This triple is to be shared by all users of the system.
- (2) For every valid OR with identity OR_i , and for every VP_{PK} v that overlaps with the VP_{MK} , the PKG generates the private key $d_{v,i} = sH(v||OR_i)$, where $||$ represents the usual concatenation operation.
- (3) The PKG distributes these private keys, as well as the signed copy of (v_m, U, sU) , to the appropriate ORs over a secure authenticated forward-secret channel. If an OR becomes compromised, the PKG can revoke it by simply no longer calculating its values of $d_{v,i}$.

Note that this key distribution can be *batched*; that is, the PKG can precompute the master keys and private keys in advance (say a week at a time), and deliver them to the ORs in batches of any size from one VP_{PK} at a time on up. This batching reduces the amount of time the PKG has to be online, and does not sacrifice forward secrecy. On the other hand, large batches will delay the time until a revocation becomes effective.

User Setup. Once during each VP_{MK} , every user has to obtain the signed triple (v_m, U, sU) from any OR or from a public Web site. Once during each VP_{PK} , every user has to compute the following pairing for each OR i and store the results locally.

$$\gamma_{v,i} = e(sU, Q_{v,i}) = e(U, Q_{v,i})^s \text{ where } Q_{v,i} = H(v||OR_i)$$

Circuit Construction. During a VP_{PK} v , a user U chooses ℓ ORs (say $OR_1, OR_2, \dots, OR_\ell$) and constructs a circuit $U \Leftrightarrow OR_1 \Leftrightarrow OR_2 \Leftrightarrow \dots \Leftrightarrow OR_\ell$ with the following steps.

- (1) For each OR_i in the circuit, the user generates a random integer $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ and computes the pseudonym $P_{U_i} = r_i U$ and the value $\gamma_{v,i}^{r_i} = e(U, Q_{v,i})^{sr_i}$. From $\gamma_{v,i}^{r_i}$ two session keys are derived: a forward session key $K_{U,i}$ and a backward session key $K_{i,U}$. Finally, the following onion is built and sent to OR_1 , the first OR in the circuit.

$$r_1 U, \{OR_2, r_2 U, \{\dots \{OR_\ell, r_\ell U, \{\emptyset\}_{K_{U,\ell}} \dots\}_{K_{U,2}}\}_{K_{U,1}} \quad (1)$$

Here $\{\dots\}_{K_{U,i}}$ is symmetric-key encryption and \emptyset is an empty message which informs OR_ℓ that OR_ℓ is the exit node.

- (2) After receiving the onion, the OR with identity OR_i uses the received $r_i U$ and its currently valid private key $d_{v,i}$ to compute $e(r_i U, d_{v,i}) = e(U, Q_{v,i})^{r_i s} = \gamma_{v,i}^{r_i}$. It derives the forward session key $K_{U,i}$ and the backward session key $K_{i,U}$. It decrypts the outermost onion layer $\{\dots\}_{K_{U,i}}$ to obtain the user's next pseudonym, the nested ciphertext, and the identity of the next node in the




Fig. 1. A user builds a circuit with three ORs.

circuit. The OR then forwards the pseudonym and ciphertext to the next node. To avoid replay attacks, it also stores pseudonyms (see Section 7). The process ends when an OR (OR_ℓ in this case) gets \emptyset .

- (3) The exit node OR_ℓ sends a confirmation message encrypted with the backward session key $\{\text{Confirm}\}_{K_{\ell,U}}$ to the previous OR in the circuit. Each OR encrypts the confirmation with its backward session key and sends it to the previous node, until the ciphertext reaches the user. The user decrypts the ciphertext layers to verify the confirmation.
- (4) If the user does not receive the confirmation in a specified time, she selects a different set of ORs and repeats the protocol.

The circuit construction is further illustrated in Figure 1, where a user builds a three-node circuit.

Anonymous Communication. After the circuit is constructed, communication proceeds in the same manner as in Tor. The user sends onions through the circuit with each layer encrypted with the forward keys $K_{U,i}$, and each hop decrypts one layer. Replies are encrypted at each hop with the backward key $K_{i,U}$, and the user decrypts the received onion.

Note that as an optimization, one or more messages can be bundled inside the original circuit construction onion, in place of \emptyset .

We analyze the security for the preceding protocol in Section 6.

4.3 Advantages Over First-Generation Onion Routing

As discussed earlier, it is possible to achieve forward secrecy in first-generation onion routing by periodically replacing the public-private key pairs of the ORs. Following the change, the service provider publishes signed copies of the new OR public keys after getting authentic copies from the ORs. However, this requires all users to regularly obtain fresh authenticated public key information for all ORs.

In contrast, with our system, each user only needs to obtain the single authenticated value (v_m, U, sU) , and only once every VP_{MK} . The user can then calculate the required $\gamma_{v,i}$ values on her own until the end of that period, thus reducing the load on the service provider. This load is further reduced by having the service provider never communicate directly with users at all, but only with the ORs.

As a consequence, our pairing-based onion routing is a more practical solution for low-latency anonymous communication.

4.4 Advantages Over Telescoping in Tor

The Tor network, in practice, uses the telescoping approach based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange to form an anonymity circuit. We find the following advantages for our protocol over the telescoping approach.

- Although the protocol defined in Section 4.2.2 requires occasional private key generation for ORs to achieve forward secrecy, it saves communication cost at every circuit construction by avoiding telescoping. We discuss our communication and computational advantages in Section 8.5.
- The absence of telescoping in our protocol provides flexibility to the user to modify a circuit on-the-fly. For example, suppose a user U has constructed a circuit $(U \Leftrightarrow OR_1 \Leftrightarrow OR_2 \Leftrightarrow \dots \Leftrightarrow OR_i \Leftrightarrow \dots \Leftrightarrow OR_\ell)$. In our protocol, she can bundle instructions to immediately replace OR_i with OR'_i in the next message, while keeping the remaining circuit intact. Her circuit would then be $(U \Leftrightarrow OR_1 \Leftrightarrow OR_2 \Leftrightarrow \dots \Leftrightarrow OR'_i \Leftrightarrow \dots \Leftrightarrow OR_\ell)$.

4.5 Issues with the Proposed Scheme

The certifying authorities in the Tor system need to be less trusted than the PKG in our scheme. It is also possible for $t + 1$ malicious PKGs to passively listen to all of the traffic as they can compute private keys for all ORs. A geographically distributed implementation of m PKGs under politically diverse ownerships can certainly reduce this possibility.

To passively decrypt an OR's messages, an adversary of the Tor system must know the OR's private key, as well as the current Diffie-Hellman key (established for each circuit). In our scheme, as it is noninteractive, an adversary who knows only the OR's private key can decrypt all of the messages for that OR. This may be an acceptable trade-off, considering the advantages gained from the noninteractive protocol.

Further, this onion routing circuit construction provides forward secrecy, only after ORs' private keys are rotated. In other words (as defined by Øverlier and Syverson [2007]), it only provides *eventual* forward secrecy rather than *immediate* forward secrecy. Consequently, it has shorter VP_{PK} as compared to the key replacement period in Tor and PKGs (any $t + 1$ of them) need to be online with greater reliability. If fewer than $t + 1$ PKGs are available, the whole system is paralysed after the current batch. In the next section, we resolve this issue, without a significant increase in circuit construction time, by introducing a partially interactive onion routing circuit construction.

5. λ -PASS ONION ROUTING

Tor achieves immediate forward secrecy using telescoping. Telescoping can also be considered as an ℓ -pass circuit construction, where ℓ is the circuit length, with immediate forward secrecy at each of the OR nodes. In practice, however, it is sufficient to have immediate forward secrecy at fewer than ℓ nodes, as an adversary will be stymied when it encounters any such node. In this section, we define λ -pass onion routing circuit construction which achieves immediate forward secrecy at λ nodes (for $2 < \lambda \leq \ell$) with reduced circuit construction cost over telescoping.

5.1 Impossibility of Immediate Forward Secrecy in Single-Pass Circuit Construction

To motivate multiple-pass circuit construction, we will describe why it is impossible to obtain immediate forward secrecy in any single-pass circuit construction, regardless of the cryptographic setting.

In an immediately forward secret circuit construction, compromise of OR private keys after a circuit is built should not allow any information about the circuit path to be recovered. Further, after the circuit is destroyed and the keys are dropped, it should not be possible for any honest user and an OR to recompute their shared keys for that session. To achieve these properties, *both* parties must contribute some randomness to the creation of the session key and they must drop these random values once the session keys are generated. Consequently, before the user can generate the forward session key, the random values (in some modified form) have to be exchanged between the user and the OR. The modified forms should enable only the authentic receiver to compute the session key. In an immediate forward secret circuit construction like Tor, these session-dependent random values are realized using the Diffie-Hellman exponents (x, y) , while the Diffie-Hellman parameters (g^x, g^y) provide the publicly exchanged forms of the randomness.

In any single-pass circuit construction, an OR does not reply immediately after receiving an onion (except for exit nodes). Therefore, addition of any randomness from the OR in the forward session key is not possible, before that session key can be used to convey the OR its successor. Consequently, any time later in the same VP_{PK} , an adversary can compromise the OR, use the OR's private key to generate the session keys, and exploit those to find the next node in the circuit path. Further, although it is possible for nodes to send their part of randomness for session keys along with the (backward) confirmation onion, this does not provide any advantage as the adversary can always find the circuit path by decrypting the forward onion. Thus we see that it is not possible to obtain immediate forward secrecy in a single-pass circuit construction.

5.2 λ -pass Circuit Construction

As replies from the last node of single-pass circuit constructions are direct, immediate forward secrecy is easy to achieve at this node. Here, we consider $\lambda - 1$ additional single-pass circuit constructions to achieve immediate forward

secrecy at λ nodes. We note that Øverlier and Syverson [2007, Protocol 3] propose a similar circuit construction, but their focus is on dealing with replay attacks. Our λ -pass protocol adds message flows to provide partial immediate forward secrecy, whereas their protocol uses an increased number of flows to prevent replay of construction onions.

5.2.1 Protocol Description. Although our λ -pass circuit construction can be applied in any public-key setting, for simplicity, here we present it for pairing-based onion routing, as defined in Section 4.

Setup, Key Generation, User Setup. These are as described in Section 4.2.2.


Circuit Construction. During a $\text{VP}_{\text{PK}} v$, a user U chooses a set of ORs (say $\text{OR}_1, \text{OR}_2, \dots, \text{OR}_\ell$) and constructs a circuit $U \Leftrightarrow \text{OR}_1 \Leftrightarrow \text{OR}_2 \Leftrightarrow \dots \Leftrightarrow \text{OR}_\ell$ with the following steps.

- (1) The user selects λ indices $\Lambda_1 < \Lambda_2 < \dots < \Lambda_{\lambda-1} < \Lambda_\lambda = \ell$.
- (2) As in Section 4.2.2, for each OR_i in the circuit, the user generates a random integer $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ and computes the pseudonym $P_{Ui} = r_i U$ and the value $\gamma_{v,i}^{r_i} = e(U, Q_{v,i})^{sr_i}$. From $\gamma_{v,i}^{r_i}$ two session keys are derived: a forward session key $K_{U,i}$ and a backward session key $K_{i,U}$. At this stage, the user erases the random values r_i for all but $r_{\Lambda_1}, r_{\Lambda_2}, \dots, r_{\Lambda_\lambda}$.
- (3) The user then creates the following onion and sends it to OR_1 .

$$r_1 U, \{\text{OR}_2, r_2 U, \{\dots \{\text{OR}_{\Lambda_1}, r_{\Lambda_1} U, \{\emptyset\}_{K_{U,\Lambda_1}}\} \dots\}_{K_{U,2}}\}_{K_{U,1}}$$

Here $\{\dots\}_{K_{U,i}}$ is symmetric-key encryption and \emptyset is an empty message which informs OR_{Λ_1} that it is the exit node.

- (4) Each node OR_i with $i \geq 1$, uses $r_i U$ and its currently valid private key $d_{v,i}$ to compute $e(r_i U, d_{v,i}) = e(U, Q_i)^{r_i s} = \gamma_{v,i}^{r_i}$. It derives the forward session keys $K_{U,i}$ and the backward session keys $K_{i,U}$. It decrypts the outermost onion layer $\{\dots\}_{K_{U,i}}$ to obtain the user's next pseudonym, the nested ciphertext, and the identity of the next node in the circuit. The OR then forwards the pseudonym and ciphertext to the next node. To avoid replay attacks, it also stores pseudonyms (see Section 7). The process ends when OR_{Λ_1} gets \emptyset .
- (5) The last node in the partial circuit OR_{Λ_1} generates a random integer $r_{U_1} \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$, and computes a pseudonym $r_{U_1} Q_{v,\Lambda_1}$. It then generates $\gamma_{v,\Lambda_1}^{r_{U_1}}$, derives modified forward and backward session keys (K_{U,Λ_1}^* and $K_{\Lambda_1,U}^*$), and sends a confirmation message encrypted with the backward session key $\{\text{Confirm}\}_{K_{\Lambda_1,U}^*}$ along with the pseudonym $r_{U_1} Q_{v,\Lambda_1}$ to the previous OR in the circuit. To obtain immediate forward secrecy, it also erases the random integer r_{U_1} and the value $\gamma_{v,\Lambda_1}^{r_{U_1}}$ right away, and will erase K_{U,Λ_1}^* and $K_{\Lambda_1,U}^*$ immediately after the circuit is no longer in use.
- (6) Each OR encrypts the confirmation with its backward session key and sends it to the previous node, until the ciphertext reaches the user. The


 Fig. 2. A user builds a circuit with four ORs and $\lambda = 3$.

user decrypts the ciphertext layers to verify the confirmation and in the process, generates the modified session keys for OR_{λ_1} using the received pseudonym $r_{U_1} Q_{v, \lambda_1}$ and the stored random value r_{λ_1} . After this, the user drops the random value r_{λ_1} .

- (7) Now, the partial circuit $U \Leftrightarrow A \cdots \Leftrightarrow OR_{\lambda_1}$ is used to extend the circuit to OR_{λ_2} by sending the following onion to OR_1 .

$$\{ \{ \cdots \{ OR_{\lambda_1+1}, r_{\lambda_1+1} U, \{ \cdots \{ OR_{\lambda_2}, r_{\lambda_2} U, \{ \emptyset \}_{K_{U, \lambda_2}} \} \cdots \}_{K_{U, \lambda_1+1}} \}_{K_{U, \lambda_1}} \cdots \}_{K_{U, 2}} \}_{K_{U, 1}}$$

- (8) The user completes λ passes to construct the complete circuit $U \Leftrightarrow OR_1 \Leftrightarrow OR_2 \Leftrightarrow \cdots \Leftrightarrow OR_\ell$.
- (9) If the user does not receive any of the λ confirmations in specified times, she selects a different set of ORs and repeats the protocol.

Anonymous Communication. As described in Section 4.2.2.

This circuit construction is further illustrated in Figure 2, where a user builds a four-node circuit with $\lambda = 3$.

We observe that the security and anonymity properties of this protocol are straightforward extensions to those of our single-pass construction in Section 4; we elaborate on security in Section 6.

5.2.2 Value of λ and Node Placement. For $\lambda = \ell$, the aforesaid circuit becomes a telescoping circuit construction. Øverlier and Syverson [2007] observe

that, in Tor, there is always forward secrecy at the entry node, as the link between the user and the entry node in the circuit is encrypted using TLS. Therefore, our circuit construction defined in Section 4, without any significant modification, can easily be a 2-pass circuit construction having immediate forward secrecy at the entry node and the exit node.

Considering an adversary who controls some of the OR network (but not all, as in our threat model, Section 4.1), it is certainly advantageous to keep $2 < \lambda \leq \ell$. We observe that for Tor, with a network of more than a thousand nodes, assuming a nonglobal and nonadaptive adversary, with access to an infrequently changing small part of the network, it is sufficient to have $\lambda = 3$; that is, immediate forward secrecy at the entry node, exit node, and one of the nodes in between. In this case, after the circuit is closed, the adversary's successive compromise of the ORs in a circuit is thwarted once it reaches the immediate forward secret node. In other words, assuming that the adversary has access to a few ORs in a circuit and can compromise all others in the network in the future, it still cannot link the two parts of the circuit divided at the immediate forward secret node.

However, for a stronger adversary, a larger value of λ is required. As an example, assume a similar network with 1000 nodes, of which 100 are compromised by a nonglobal but mobile adversary which adaptively modifies its set of compromised nodes at a very fast rate of one node per ten minutes. Similar to Tor, if users here change their onion routing circuits every ten minutes, then $\lambda = 6$ should be sufficient. With probability less than 0.01, even if the adversary owns two out of six immediate forward secret nodes and compromises one more while the circuit is still functioning, at least one immediate forward secret node other than the entry and the exit nodes will remain uncompromised until the circuit is closed and provide the necessary unlinkability.

An immediate question is the placement of the immediate forward secret nodes in the circuit path. It is easy to observe that a circuit with two adjacent immediate forward secret nodes is more difficult to attack using traffic analysis than one where those two nodes are separated. Further, as the ultimate goal of onion routing is anonymity for the sender and receiver, it is good to have immediate forward secret nodes at the start and at the end of the circuit. Therefore, we suggest $\lceil \lambda/2 \rceil$ immediate forward secret nodes at the start of the circuit and remaining $\lfloor \lambda/2 \rfloor$ immediate forward secret nodes at the end of the circuit. In cases when the recipient does not require anonymity (e.g., it is a Web server), the efficiency of the construction can be improved by placing the first $\lambda - 1$ nodes closest to the sender; that is, by selecting $\Lambda_i = i$ for $1 \leq i \leq \lambda - 1$ and $\Lambda_\lambda = \ell$. An attacker who observes the onion past the last forward secret node may be able to decrypt the remaining layers, but the first $\lambda - 1$ forward secret nodes have already provided anonymity for the sender.

Once the random parameters r_{U_i} and r_{Λ_i} are dropped by the OR_{Λ_i} and the user U respectively, deriving their session keys becomes the BDH problem, even if OR_{Λ_i} gets compromised during the VP_{PK} . Therefore, we achieve immediate forward secrecy at λ ORs and the VP_{PK} could be longer, or made equal to the VP_{MK} . The latter would also eliminate the need to attach validity periods to OR identities.

6. SECURITY ANALYSIS

Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [2005] give a protocol for onion routing with provable security in the Universal Composability (UC) model Canetti [2001]. The UC model imposes additional overhead on their protocol. We aim for a simpler and more efficient protocol at the expense of provability in the UC model. Nevertheless, we prove some security properties of our protocol. Here is a list of the properties we consider; detailed definitions will follow.

- Cryptographic unlinkability.* This property ensures that a circuit, which has at least one honest node, provides unlinkability between a sender and a receiver. This property allows us to use a strong attack model; anonymity is still possible when the adversary controls all but one of the routers in the path. By the term *cryptographic unlinkability* we exclude network-level linking attacks.
- Integrity and correctness.* These properties are defined by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [2005]. An onion routing scheme has the *correctness* property if a message reaches the intended recipient whenever the an onion is (i) formed correctly, (ii) processed by the right routers in the right order, and (iii) these routers follow the protocol. Integrity is achieved if onions longer than some upper limit on the length can be recognized by routers. We observe that our circuit construction trivially achieves these correctness and integrity properties.
- Key secrecy.* An attacker controlling all but one honest node in a circuit should not be able to recover the secret key shared between the user and the honest node. Since this is effectively a run of the protocol in Section 3.2 between the user and the honest node, the security proof in Section 3.3.2 applies here as well.
- Circuit position secrecy.* Other works on the subject [Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2005; Möller 2003] desire the following property, which we term *circuit position secrecy*. When a router receives an onion, it should not be possible for it to learn which position it has in a circuit (unless it is the entry or exit node). We discuss how to provide circuit position secrecy.

Note that when proving security using the previous properties, our λ -pass circuit construction in Section 5.2 can be considered equivalent to λ passes of our single-pass circuit construction protocol. Therefore, we do not consider it separately in our security discussion.

6.1 Cryptographic Unlinkability

Suppose an adversary controls all routers in a circuit of length ℓ except for one honest router, H . By collapsing the adversarial routers into a single entity, we can distill this scenario into

$$\text{User } U \rightarrow A_1 \rightarrow H \rightarrow A_2 \rightarrow \text{Recipient R,}$$

where nodes A_1 and A_2 are controlled by the adversary. When U sends an onion to A_1 , it is processed and forwarded to H who processes it and forwards it to A_2 . If A_2 can determine that the onion received from H was also processed

by A_1 , then U and R can be linked. Traffic analysis and timing/correlation attacks may be able to link U and R , but in this section we show that there is no *cryptographic* linking possible.

When there are multiple users in the system (a basic assumption for all anonymity systems), the problem can be illustrated as follows.

$$\begin{array}{ccc} U \rightarrow A_1 & & A_2 \rightarrow R \\ & \searrow H \nearrow & \\ U' \rightarrow A'_1 & & A'_2 \rightarrow R' \end{array}$$

We will show that this problem is equivalent to distinguishing ciphertexts.

The situation depicted before is captured by the following security game, which we call the *cryptographic unlinkability game*.

Setup. The challenger \mathcal{C} performs the setup described by the onion routing protocol. The adversary \mathcal{A} chooses $m, \text{ID}_{A_1}, \text{ID}_{A'_1}, \text{ID}_{A_2}, \text{ID}_{A'_2}, \text{ID}_H$. \mathcal{C} sends the private keys for $\text{ID}_{A_1}, \text{ID}_{A'_1}, \text{ID}_{A_2}, \text{ID}_{A'_2}$, to \mathcal{A} . It is assumed that router identities are of a fixed length to avoid attacks based on the ciphertext sizes.

Create onions. The challenger chooses $b \in \{0, 1\}$ at random.

If $b = 0$, \mathcal{C} sends to \mathcal{A} :

$$\begin{aligned} O_1 \text{ for circuit } U \rightarrow A_1 \rightarrow H \rightarrow A_2 \\ &= \text{ID}_{A_1}, r_{A_1}U, \{\text{ID}_H, r_HU, \{\text{ID}_{A_2}, r_{A_2}U, \{m\}_{K_{U,A_2}}\}_{K_{U,H}}\}_{K_{U,A_1}} \\ O'_1 \text{ for circuit } U \rightarrow A'_1 \rightarrow H \rightarrow A'_2 \\ &= \text{ID}_{A'_1}, r_{A'_1}U, \{\text{ID}_H, r'_H U, \{\text{ID}_{A'_2}, r_{A'_2}U, \{m\}_{K_{U,A'_2}}\}_{K_{U,H'}}\}_{K_{U,A'_1}} \end{aligned}$$

and if $b = 1$, \mathcal{C} sends to \mathcal{A} :

$$\begin{aligned} O_1 \text{ for circuit } U \rightarrow A_1 \rightarrow H \rightarrow A'_2 \\ &= \text{ID}_{A_1}, r_{A_1}U, \{\text{ID}_H, r_HU, \{\text{ID}_{A'_2}, r_{A'_2}U, \{m\}_{K_{U,A'_2}}\}_{K_{U,H}}\}_{K_{U,A_1}} \\ O'_1 \text{ for circuit } U \rightarrow A'_1 \rightarrow H \rightarrow A_2 \\ &= \text{ID}_{A'_1}, r_{A'_1}U, \{\text{ID}_H, r'_H U, \{\text{ID}_{A_2}, r_{A_2}U, \{m\}_{K_{U,A_2}}\}_{K_{U,H'}}\}_{K_{U,A'_1}}. \end{aligned}$$

A_1 processing. The node A_1 processes the onions O_1 and O'_1 before passing them along to H (A_1 may or may not follow the protocol). The resulting onions O_H and O'_H respectively are then returned to \mathcal{C} .

H processing. \mathcal{C} removes the layer encrypted for H . If the decryptions are invalid the game is aborted (\mathcal{C} will know since it created the onions). If the decryptions are valid, \mathcal{C} returns the resulting O_2, O'_2 to \mathcal{A} . Here, O_2 and O'_2 are the output onions destined for A_2 and A'_2 respectively.

Guess. \mathcal{A} must determine which input onion corresponds to which output onion by outputting a guess bit b' . We say that the adversary \mathcal{A} (t, ϵ)-wins the game if \mathcal{A} outputs b' in time t such that $\Pr[b' = b] = 1/2 + \epsilon$.

Winning this cryptographic unlinkability game can be reduced to distinguishing ciphertexts. To prove this, we first present the **IND-CPA** game for (indistinguishability in a chosen plaintext attack).

Setup. Let E_K be a symmetric encryption function which uses key K . C chooses K at random from the keyspace associated with E .

Extraction Queries An adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\text{IND-CPA}}$ is given oracle access to E_K . She can obtain ciphertexts for polynomially bounded number of plaintext messages of her choice any time during the game.

Challenge. The $\mathcal{A}_{\text{IND-CPA}}$ chooses two equal length plaintexts m_0, m_1 , and sends them to C . C chooses $b \in \{0, 1\}$ at random, and sends $E_K(m_b)$ to $\mathcal{A}_{\text{IND-CPA}}$.

Guess. $\mathcal{A}_{\text{IND-CPA}}$ outputs a guess $b' \in \{0, 1\}$. We say that $\mathcal{A}_{\text{IND-CPA}}$ (t, ϵ) -wins the **IND-CPA** game if $\mathcal{A}_{\text{IND-CPA}}$ returns b' in time t such that $\Pr[b = b'] = 1/2 + \epsilon$.

A similar game, which we call the simultaneous-IND-CPA (**s-IND-CPA**) game, arises from the cryptographic unlinkability problem described earlier.

Setup. Let E_K be an encryption function which uses key K . C chooses K_1, K_2 at random from the keyspace associated with E .

Extraction Queries. An adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\text{s-IND-CPA}}$ is given oracle access to E_{K_1} and E_{K_2} . She obtains ciphertexts for a polynomially bounded number of plaintext messages of her choice any time during the game.

Challenge. $\mathcal{A}_{\text{s-IND-CPA}}$ chooses equal length plaintexts m_0, m_1 , and sends them to C . C chooses $b \in \{0, 1\}$ at random, and sends $E_{K_1}(m_b)$ and $E_{K_2}(m_{1-b})$ to $\mathcal{A}_{\text{s-IND-CPA}}$.

Guess. $\mathcal{A}_{\text{s-IND-CPA}}$ outputs a guess $b' \in \{0, 1\}$. We say that $\mathcal{A}_{\text{s-IND-CPA}}$ (t, ϵ) -wins the **s-IND-CPA** game if $\mathcal{A}_{\text{s-IND-CPA}}$ returns b' in time t such that $\Pr[b = b'] = 1/2 + \epsilon$.

We say an encryption function E is **(s-)IND-CPA** if for any adversary \mathcal{A} which (t, ϵ) -wins the **(s-)IND-CPA** game, ϵ is negligible if t is polynomial.

LEMMA 1. *If E is a family of pseudorandom permutations, then E is **IND-CPA** if and only if it is **s-IND-CPA**.*

PROOF. First assume an adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\text{IND-CPA}}$, which can (t, ϵ) -win an **IND-CPA** game $(m_0, m_1, E_K(m_b))$. Given an access to such an adversary, an **s-IND-CPA** game $(m_0, m_1, E_{K_1}(m_b), E_{K_2}(m_{1-b}))$ can be (t, ϵ) -won simply by sending the query $(m_0, m_1, E_{K_1}(m_b))$ to the adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\text{IND-CPA}}$. Therefore, E is **s-IND-CPA** $\Rightarrow E$ is **IND-CPA**.

Now assume E is a family of pseudorandom permutations and is **IND-CPA**, and suppose there is an adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\text{s-IND-CPA}}$, which (t, γ) -wins the **simultaneous-IND-CPA** game $(m_0, m_1, E_{K_1}(m_b), E_{K_2}(m_{1-b}))$ for nonnegligible γ . For an **IND-CPA** input $(m_0, m_1, E_K(m_i))$, we present $\mathcal{A}_{\text{s-IND-CPA}}$ with the **s-IND-CPA** instance $(m_0, m_1, E_K(m_i), \$)$ where $\$$ is a random string of length $|E_K(m_i)|$, and with oracle access to E_{K_2} for a randomly chosen key K_2 . Suppose $\mathcal{A}_{\text{s-IND-CPA}}$ returns i with probability $1/2 + \kappa$. It follows that $\mathcal{A}_{\text{s-IND-CPA}}$ can be used to

distinguish encryptions of E with key K_2 from randomly chosen strings with probability $1/2 + \mu$, where $\mu = |\gamma - \kappa|$. Since E is assumed to be a pseudorandom permutation, μ must be negligible, and $\kappa \geq \gamma - \mu$. Therefore, E is **IND-CPA** \Rightarrow E is **s-IND-CPA**. \square

THEOREM 2. *If E is a family of pseudorandom permutations which is **IND-CPA**, then for any adversary which (t, ϵ) -wins the cryptographic unlinkability game, if t is polynomial, then ϵ is negligible.*

PROOF. Suppose \mathcal{A} is playing the unlinkability game; we focus on the Guess step. \mathcal{A} has O_H and O'_H (the onions processed by \mathcal{C}), which are not encryptions of m (which he chose), but encryptions $M_1 = \{m\}_{K_{U,A_1}}$ and $M_2 = \{m\}_{K_{U,A_2}}$ known to \mathcal{A} . This gives us an instance of **s-IND-CPA** except \mathcal{A} did not get to choose the messages. If \mathcal{A} (t, ϵ) -solves this instance for nonnegligible ϵ , \mathcal{A} can certainly (t, ϵ) -solve instances where \mathcal{A} chooses M_1, M_2 . By Lemma 1 \mathcal{A} solves an instance of **IND-CPA** as well. \square

Therefore, if our encryption function is indistinguishable in a chosen plaintext attack, then our onion routing protocol has cryptographic unlinkability (in our model of multiple users and one honest router per circuit). Since key secrecy is proven for our construction, any symmetric key encryption which provides indistinguishability given key secrecy will give our protocol cryptographic unlinkability.

6.2 Circuit Position Secrecy (CPS)

We now treat the issue of preventing routers from learning their positions in a circuit. In our model, since users will typically not be routers in the system, routers may check if they are in the first position by determining whether the sender is a nonrouter. Similarly for the last router, since the destination will rarely be a router in the network.

Note that an adversary who controls all but one router in a circuit and who knows the circuit length is always able to deduce which position his routers have in *some* circuit. The best possible outcome with respect to CPS is that adversarial nodes “sandwiched” between two honest nodes learn nothing about their position.

The circuit construction protocol given (Sections 4.2.2 and 5.2) does not provide CPS, since the size of the onion changes after each step of processing. Using ideas from the construction of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [2005] we may enhance our new circuit construction to provide CPS. We describe the changes to the protocol of Section 4.2.2 (this is the simplest case $\lambda = 1$). The symmetric key cipher used will be the pseudorandom permutation (PRP) $E : \{0, 1\}^{\ell_k} \times \{0, 1\}^{\ell_E} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_E}$, where 2^{ℓ_k} is the size of the keyspace and 2^{ℓ_E} is the size of the message space and ciphertext space. Recall that κ is a security parameter. The notation $x \in_R S$ means x is chosen uniformly at random from the set S .

We modify the construction of the onion from Eq. (1) as follows. Set

$$\begin{aligned} y_1 &= \{0^\kappa, \text{OR}_2, r_2 U\}_{K_{U,1}} \\ y_2 &= \{\{0^\kappa, \text{OR}_3, r_3 U\}_{K_{U,2}}\}_{K_{U,1}} \\ &\vdots \\ y_{\ell-1} &= \{\dots\{0^\kappa, \text{OR}_\ell, r_\ell U\}_{K_{U,\ell-1}}\dots\}_{K_{U,1}} \\ y_\ell &= \{\dots\{0^\kappa, \emptyset\}_{K_{U,\ell}}\dots\}_{K_{U,1}} \end{aligned}$$

We will denote the ℓ -tuple (y_1, \dots, y_ℓ) by Y . The user now chooses π , a random permutation of $\{1, \dots, \ell\}$, and sends the onion $(r_1 U, (y_{\pi(1)}, \dots, y_{\pi(\ell)}))$ to OR_1 . The reason for including κ zeros at the beginning of each plaintext is to allow routers to distinguish plaintexts from nested ciphertexts and invalid decryptions. Since E is a PRP, if a ciphertext c is modified, the probability that $E^{-1}(c)$ begins with κ zeros is $1/2^\kappa$. All ℓ plaintexts must have the same length (ℓ_E bits), and are padded if necessary.

The processing step must also be changed. Upon receiving $(r_i U, Y)$ from OR_{i-1} (or the user, when $i = 1$), OR_i performs the following steps.

- (1) Verify that $r_i U \in \mathbb{G}$. Use $r_i U$ to derive $K_{U,i}$ and $K_{i,U}$ (as before).
- (2) For $j = 1, \dots, \ell$, decrypt y_j using $K_{U,i}$. $y_{\pi(i)}$ will decrypt to $0^\kappa, \text{OR}_{i+1}, r_{i+1} U$. The item $y_{\pi(i)}$ is replaced by $y' \in_R \{0, 1\}^{\ell_E}$, and $r_{i+1} U$ replaces $r_i U$. OR_i forwards

$$(r_{i+1} U, (y_1, \dots, y', \dots, y_\ell))$$

to OR_{i+1} . The index $\pi(i)$ is kept for the duration of the circuit.

- (3) If, in the previous step, $y_{\pi(i)}$ decrypts to \emptyset , this node is the exit node, OR_ℓ . OR_ℓ replaces $y_{\pi(\ell)}$ with $\{\text{Confirm}\}_{K_{i,U}}$, sets the other $\ell - 1$ values of Y to random elements of $\{0, 1\}^{\ell_E}$, and sends (r'_ℓ, Y) to $\text{OR}_{\ell-1}$ where $r'_\ell \in_R \mathbb{G}$. Along the return path, OR_i replaces $y_{\pi(i)}$ with $\{\text{Confirm}\}_{K_{i,U}}$, encrypts the other values in Y with $K_{i,U}$, and replaces r'_{i+1} with $r'_i \in_R \mathbb{G}$. OR_i sends (r'_i, Y) to OR_{i-1} .

On the return path, the only purpose the random group elements r'_i serve is to provide indistinguishability between the forward and backward portions of the construction. The *anonymous communication* step is unchanged.

We now prove CPS for the modified construction.

THEOREM 3. *Let \mathcal{A} be a polynomially bounded adversary at position i , who receives onion O_i in the modified onion routing protocol defined before. Let \mathbf{X} be a random variable defined on $\{2, \dots, \ell - 1\}$, the set of possible positions for \mathcal{A} . If E is a family of PRPs which is IND-CPA secure, and nodes $i - 1$ and $i + 1$ are honest, then $\Pr[\mathbf{X}|O_i]$ is computationally indistinguishable from $\Pr[\mathbf{X}]$.*

PROOF. We proceed by showing that \mathcal{A} cannot extract any information from O_i which may help determine i . We may assume that OR_{i-1} , who is honest, will drop any malformed traffic, and output O_i with the correct form: an element of $\mathbb{G} \times (\{0, 1\}^{\ell_E})^\ell$. Therefore the lengths of values in O_i will not leak information about i . Each router learns $\pi(i)$, but since π is chosen uniformly at random, and independently of i , \mathcal{A} learns no information about i from $\pi(i)$. Second,

the decryption of $y_{\pi(i)}$ contains no information about i , since it was created by the user, who is honest. What remains to show is that the values $r_i U, Y - (y_{\pi(i)})$ give no information to \mathcal{A} , which we do by showing that $r_i U, Y - (y_{\pi(i)})$ is computationally indistinguishable from a random element of $\mathbb{G} \times (\{0, 1\}^{\ell_E})^{\ell-1}$. We are assured that $r_i U$ is a random element of \mathbb{G} , since it was chosen by the user, and not modified by OR_{i-1} , since OR_{i-1} is honest. Similarly, $y_{\pi(i-1)}$ is a random value of $\{0, 1\}^{\ell_E}$, since OR_{i-1} follows the protocol. The remaining values in Y have had $E_{K_{U,(i-1)}}^{-1}$ applied to them, to give two possibilities. If y_j was honestly processed before reaching OR_{i-1} , \mathcal{A} may remove layer i , but in all $j \neq \pi(i)$ we can be sure that either this was randomized (in positions $\pi(k)$ for $k < i - 1$) or that at least the $(i + 1)$ -th layer of encryption remains (in positions $\pi(k)$ for $k > i$). Since OR_{i+1} is honest, \mathcal{A} does not have $K_{U,(i+1)}$, hence these positions are indistinguishable from random to \mathcal{A} (since E is IND-CPA secure). In the second case, y_j was dishonestly processed before reaching OR_{i-1} and $E_{K_{U,(i-1)}}^{-1}(y_j)$ arrives at OR_i . Again, since E is a PRP which is IND-CPA secure, this is indistinguishable from a random value in $\{0, 1\}^{\ell_E}$.

Finally, since OR_{i+1} and OR_{i-1} are honest, they will not collude with \mathcal{A} to help \mathcal{A} learn i (for instance, by sharing any knowledge they have of $i + 1, i - 1$). \square

By similar arguments we may show that by observing the links between $\text{OR}_1 \leftrightarrow \text{OR}_2 \leftrightarrow \dots \leftrightarrow \text{OR}_\ell$ it is impossible for a polynomial-time adversary to distinguish the forward part of the construction from the reverse part. To handle the case when $\lambda > 1$, the aforesaid construction may be used as is with $|Y| = \ell$. During the *anonymous communication* step, the size of the onion is unchanged at each hop, and only the exit node learns anything from the contents.

7. SYSTEMS ISSUES

In this section, we describe how components of an onion routing system such as Tor would function in a pairing-based setting. To implement pairings, we must choose groups where pairings are known, and are efficiently computable. Once these groups are fixed we can estimate the computational cost required to construct a circuit. The next section will compare the costs of our schemes to the cost of setting up a circuit in Tor.

PKG. As discussed in Section 3.4, the PKG should be distributed across servers run by independent parties. To provide robustness, a “ t of m ” secret sharing scheme may be employed; this would mean that an OR need only contact $t + 1$ of m “pieces” of the PKG to learn its complete private key. Naturally, private key information must always be communicated over a secure channel. We note that end users of the system will have no reason to contact the PKG; the PKG only communicates with ORs, and sends one private key (an element of \mathbb{G}) per VP_{PK} to each. The load on the PKG should therefore be quite manageable. For added protection from attack, the PKG could even situate itself as a “hidden service” [Dingledine et al. 2004, Section 5], so that only known ORs could even connect to it, and no one would know where many of the pieces were located.

Channel Security. The security and forward secrecy depends on the channel between the PKG and the OR used to compute the private key. With a nondistributed PKG, an attacker can compromise an OR's private key by compromising this channel. The distributed PKG provides robustness here as well, since the attacker must subvert $t + 1$ secure channels to reconstruct the private key from the shares.

Onion Router Identities. Users calculate $\gamma_{v,i}$ based on each router's identity ID_i . This identity can be as simple as a port number and a hostname or IP address. In that case, the BF-IBE setup ensures that if a user knows how to contact an OR, she automatically knows its public key.

The value $\gamma_{v,i}$ is also based on the current $VP_{PK} v$. To avoid requiring tight synchronization between the clocks of ORs and users, ORs should keep their private keys $d_{v,i}$ around for a short time after the official end of the VP_{PK} , but must securely discard them after that.

Replay Prevention. To avoid attacks where adversaries replay old circuit construction onions, ORs should store the pseudonyms they receive for the duration of a VP_{PK} and drop onions which reuse a pseudonym. After circuit construction, replay attacks can be prevented with existing methods [Dingledine and Mathewson 2008].

Directory Servers. Directory servers can be used to provide signed information about the list of available ORs to the users of the system. The directory servers in Tor, for example, provide a list of the ORs along with their public keys, status, capabilities, and policies. In our pairing-based setting, of course, the public keys are unnecessary.

8. PERFORMANCE

In this section, we consider the cost of single-pass and λ -pass circuit constructions from a user through ℓ onion routers. We estimate the computational cost, and count the number of AES-encrypted network communications. We compare the performance of our systems to that of Tor.

8.1 Security Levels and Parameter Sizes

Before comparing the costs of the cryptography in the schemes we determine the parameter sizes required to provide the same level of security currently provided by Tor.

Tor uses public key parameters to provide security at the 80-bit level [Goldberg 2006]. The discrete log problem is in a 1024-bit field, and the RSA problem uses a 1024-bit modulus. The symmetric parameters provide significantly more security, by using AES with a 128-bit key.

We must choose appropriate groups \mathbb{G} and \mathbb{G}_T over which our pairing will be defined in order to offer similar strength. The current favourite choice is the group of torsion points of an elliptic curve group over a finite field, with either the Weil or Tate pairing. To achieve an 80-bit security level, the elliptic curve discrete log problem an attacker faces must be in a group of at least

160 bits. Due to the reduction of Menezes et al. [1991], we must also ensure that discrete logs are intractable in the target group, \mathbb{G}_T . In our case, $\mathbb{G}_T = \mathbb{F}_{p^k}$, where k is the embedding degree of our curve taken over \mathbb{F}_p . We must then choose our curve E , a prime p , and embedding degree k such that $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ has a cyclic subgroup of prime order $n \approx 2^{160}$, and p^k is around 2^{1024} . This can be achieved in a variety of ways, but two common choices are $k = 2$, $p \approx 2^{512}$ and $k = 6$, $p \approx 2^{171}$. Pairing implementations with both sets of parameters are available in the PBC library [Lynn 2008]. Efficiency studies suggest that $k = 2$ and the Tate pairing can offer better performance at this security level [Koblitz and Menezes 2005], so we make that choice.

8.2 Cost of Building a Circuit with Tor

Tor builds circuits by telescoping. A user Uriel chooses a Tor node (say Alice), and establishes a secure channel using an encrypted Diffie-Hellman exchange. She then picks a second node, Bob, and over this secure channel, establishes a new secure channel to Bob with another (end-to-end) encrypted Diffie-Hellman exchange. She proceeds in this manner until the circuit is of some desired length ℓ . For details, see the Tor specification [Dingledine and Mathewson 2008]. Note that Uriel cannot use the same Diffie-Hellman parameters with different nodes, lest those nodes be able to determine that the same user was communicating with each of them.

Each Diffie-Hellman exchange requires Uriel to perform two modular exponentiations with 1024-bit moduli and 320-bit exponents. Likewise, each server also performs two of these exponentiations. Uriel RSA-encrypts the Diffie-Hellman parameter she sends to the server, and the server decrypts it. The AES and hashing operations involved have negligible costs compared to these.

Uriel's circuit construction to Alice takes two messages: one from Uriel to Alice, and one from Alice to Uriel. When Uriel extends this circuit to Bob (via Alice), there are four additional messages: Uriel to Alice, Alice to Bob, Bob to Alice, and Alice to Uriel. Continuing in this way, we see that the total number of messages required for Tor to construct a circuit of length ℓ is $\ell(\ell+1)$. Note that each of these messages needs to be encrypted and decrypted at each hop.

8.3 Cost of Building a Circuit with Pairing-Based Onion Routing

In order to create a circuit of length ℓ with our single-pass circuit construction, the user Uriel must choose ℓ random elements r_i of \mathbb{Z}_n^* . As before, Uriel should not reuse these values. She then computes $r_S U$ and $\gamma_S^{r_S}$, and derives the forward and backward keys $K_{U,S}$ and $K_{S,U}$ from $\gamma_S^{r_S}$, for each server S in the circuit. Note that the γ_S values were precomputed, and cost nothing during each circuit creation. Each server computes $e(r_S U, d_S) = \gamma_S^{r_S}$ for its current private key d_S and derives $K_{U,S}$ and $K_{S,U}$.

Uriel creates one message, as in Figure 1, and sends it to the first server in the chain. This server decrypts a layer and sends the result to the second server in the chain, and so on, for a total of ℓ hop-by-hop encrypted messages. At the end of the chain, the last server replies with a confirmation message

Table I. Comparison of Costs of Setting Up a Circuit of Length ℓ

Operation	Time (ms)	Tor		PB-OR		λ -Pass PB-OR		
		user	OR	user	OR	user	efs-OR	ifs-OR
Pairing	2.9	0	0	0	1	λ	1	1
RSA decryption	2.7	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Exponentiation (Tor)	1.5	2ℓ	2	0	0	0	0	0
Multiplication in \mathbb{G}	1.0	0	0	ℓ	0	ℓ	0	1
Exponentiation in \mathbb{G}_T	0.2	0	0	ℓ	0	ℓ	0	1
RSA encryption	0.1	ℓ	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total time (ms)		3.1ℓ	5.7	1.2ℓ	2.9	$1.2\ell + 2.9\lambda$	2.9	4.1
Total AES-encrypted messages		$\ell(\ell + 1)$		2ℓ		$2\lambda\Lambda_{\text{avg}}$		

The values in the Tor column are based on the Tor specification [Dingledine and Mathewson 2008]. PB-OR represents our pairing-based onion routing schemes. efs-OR indicates eventual forward secret ORs, while ifs-OR indicates immediate forward secret ones. Λ_{avg} represents the average of the indices of the λ immediate forward secret nodes.

that travels back through the chain, producing ℓ more messages, for a total of 2ℓ .

8.4 Cost of Building a λ -Pass Pairing-Based Onion Routing Circuit

Our λ -pass pairing-based onion routing circuit construction is similar to that of our single-pass construction. Additional tasks that the immediate forward secret nodes must do are generation of a random integer r_{U_i} , computation of the pseudonym $r_{U_i} Q_{v\Lambda_i}$, and computation of $\gamma_{v\Lambda_i}^{r_{U_i}}$. Uriel correspondingly has to perform λ pairing computations to generate modified session keys using the received pseudonyms $r_{U_i} Q_{v\Lambda_i}$ from λ immediate forward secret nodes. The number of messages and corresponding AES encryptions depends on the positions of the λ immediate forward secret nodes in the circuit. It is equal to $2 \sum_{i=1}^{\lambda} \Lambda_i = 2\lambda\Lambda_{\text{avg}}$, where Λ_{avg} is the average of the indices of the immediate forward secret nodes in the circuit.

8.5 Comparison and Discussion

We summarize the results of the previous three sections in Table I. We count the number of “bignum” operations for each of the client and the servers, both for Tor and for our pairing-based onion routing protocols. We ignore the comparatively negligible computational costs of AES operations and hashing. For each bignum operation, we include a benchmark timing. These timings were gathered on a 3.0 GHz Pentium D desktop using the PBC pairing-based cryptography library (version 0.4.7) [Lynn 2008].

We can see that the total computation time to construct a circuit of length ℓ using our single-pass method is 61% less on the user side and 49% less on the OR side as compared to using Tor. In addition, this circuit construction uses only a linear number of AES-encrypted messages, while Tor uses a quadratic number. As compared to single-pass circuit construction, our λ -pass circuit construction requires an additional λ pairing computations by the user, requiring a total of $1.2\ell + 2.9\lambda$ ms, and on average $2.9 + 1.2\lambda/\ell$ ms for each of the ORs. For

proposed values of $\lambda = 3, 4$, or 5 , these are certainly reasonable times, considering the advantage of immediate forward secrecy, and having $VP_{PK} = VP_{MK}$.

9. CONCLUSION

We have presented new pairing-based approaches for circuit construction in onion routing anonymity networks. We first extended the protocol of Sakai et al. [2000] to allow for one-way or two-way anonymous or pseudonymous key agreement. We then used this extension to produce new circuit construction protocols.

Our single-pass circuit construction uses significantly less computation and communication than the corresponding protocol in Tor, and reduces the load on the network support infrastructure. To achieve immediate forward secrecy instead of eventual forward secrecy, we have also defined λ -pass circuit construction. These improvements can be used to improve the efficiency and to enhance the scalability of low-latency anonymity networks.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank the anonymous reviewers of PETS 2007 and TISSEC for their constructive feedback, which improved an earlier version of this article. Finally, we would also like to thank Sk. Md. Mizanur Rahman for providing us with an advance copy of the proceedings version of Rahman et al. [2006].

REFERENCES

- BLAKE, I., SEROUSSI, G., AND SMART, N. P., Eds. 2005. *Advances in Elliptic Curve Cryptography*. London Mathematical Society Lecture Note Series, No. 317, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 183–252.
- BONEH, D. AND FRANKLIN, M. 2001. Identity-based encryption from the weil pairing. In *Proceedings of the International Cryptology Conference, Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO'01)*. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2139, Springer, 213–229.
- CAMENISCH, J. AND LYSYANSKAYA, A. 2005. A formal treatment of onion routing. In *Proceedings of the International Cryptology Conference, Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO'05)*. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3621, Springer, 169–187.
- CANETTI, R. 2001. Universally composable security: A new paradigm for cryptographic protocols. In *Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'01)*. IEEE Computer Society, 136–145.
- CANETTI, R., HALEVI, S., AND KATZ, J. 2007. A forward-secure public-key encryption scheme. *J. Cryptol.* 20, 3, 265–294.
- CHAUM, D. 1981. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms. *Comm. ACM* 4, 2, 84–88.
- CHIEN, H. AND LIN, R. 2006. Identity-based key agreement protocol for mobile ad-hoc networks using bilinear pairing. In *Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Sensor Networks, Ubiquitous, and Trustworthy Computing (SUTC'06)*. IEEE Computer Society, 520–529.
- CORON, J.-S. 2000. On the exact security of full domain hash. In *Proceedings of the International Cryptology Conference, Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO'00)*. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1880, Springer, 229–235.
- DAI, W. 1998. PipeNet 1.1. <http://www.weidai.com/pipenet.txt>.
- DINGLEDINE, R. AND MATHEWSON, N. 2008. Tor protocol specification. <https://www.torproject.org/svn/trunk/doc/spec/tor-spec.txt>.
- DINGLEDINE, R., MATHEWSON, N., AND SYVERSON, P. 2004. Tor: The second-generation onion router. In *Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Security Symposium*. USENIX, 303–320.
- ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, Vol. 13, No. 4, Article 29, Pub. date: December 2010.

- DUPONT, R. AND ENGE, A. 2006. Provably secure non-interactive key distribution based on pairings. *Discr. Appl. Math.* 154, 2, 270–276.
- FREEDMAN, M. J. AND MORRIS, R. 2002. Tarzan: A peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer. In *Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'02)*. ACM, 193–206.
- GOLDBERG, I. 2006. On the security of the tor authentication protocol. In *Proceedings of the 6th Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET'06)*. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4258, Springer, 316–331.
- GOLDSCHLAG, D., REED, M., AND SYVERSON, P. 1996. Hiding routing information. In *Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Information Hiding*. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1174, Springer, 137–150.
- HUANG, D. 2007. Pseudonym-based cryptography for anonymous communications in mobile ad hoc networks. *Int. J. Secur. Netw.* 2, 3-4, 272–283.
- KATE, A. AND GOLDBERG, I. 2007. A distributed private-key generator for identity-based cryptography. Tech. rep. CACR 2007-33, Centre for Applied Cryptographic Research. <http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/techreports/2007/cacr2007-33.pdf>.
- KATE, A., ZAVERUCHA, G. M., AND GOLDBERG, I. 2007a. Pairing-based onion routing. In *Proceedings of the 7th Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS'07)*. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4776, Springer, 95–112.
- KATE, A., ZAVERUCHA, G. M., AND HENGARTNER, U. 2007b. Anonymity and security in delay tolerant networks. In *Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks (SecureComm'07)*. IEEE Computer Society, 504–513.
- KHALILI, A., KATZ, J., AND ARBAUGH, W. 2003. Toward secure key distribution in truly ad-hoc networks. In *Proceedings of the IEEE Workshop on Security and Assurance in Ad-Hoc Networks*. IEEE Computer Society, 342–346.
- KOBLITZ, N. AND MENEZES, A. 2005. Pairing-based cryptography at high security levels. In *Proceedings of the 10th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding*. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3796, Springer, 13–36.
- LYNN, B. 2008. PBC library—The pairing-based cryptography library. <http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/>.
- MAUW, S., VERSCHUREN, J., AND DE VINK, E. 2004. A formalization of anonymity and onion routing. In *Proceedings of the 9th European Symposium on Research Computer Security (ESORICS'04)*. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3193, Springer, 109–124.
- MENEZES, A., OKAMOTO, T., AND VANSTONE, S. 1991. Reducing elliptic curve logarithms to logarithms in a finite field. In *Proceedings of the 23rd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC'91)*. ACM, 80–89.
- MENEZES, A., OORSCHOT, P. V., AND VANSTONE, S. 1997. *Handbook of Applied Cryptography* 1st Ed. CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL.
- MÖLLER, B. 2003. Provably secure public-key encryption for length-preserving chaumian mixes. In *Proceedings of the Cryptographers Track at the RSA Conference (CT-RSA'03)*. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2612, Springer, 244–262.
- OKAMOTO, E. AND OKAMOTO, T. 2005. Cryptosystems based on elliptic curve pairing. In *Proceedings of the Conference on Modeling Decisions for Artificial Intelligence (MDAI'05)*. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3558, Springer, 13–23.
- ØVERLIER, L. AND SYVERSON, P. 2007. Improving efficiency and simplicity of tor circuit establishment and hidden services. In *Proceedings of the 7th Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS'07)*. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4776, Springer, 134–152.
- RAHMAN, S., INOMATA, A., OKAMOTO, T., MAMBO, M., AND OKAMOTO, E. 2006. Anonymous secure communication in wireless mobile ad-hoc networks. In *Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Ubiquitous Convergence Technology (ICUCT'06)*. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4412, Springer, 140–149.
- REED, M., SYVERSON, P., AND GOLDSCHLAG, D. 1998. Anonymous connections and onion routing. *IEEE J. Select. Areas Comm.* 16, 4, 482–494.

- RENNHARD, M. AND PLATTNER, B. 2002. Introducing MorphMix: Peer-to-peer based anonymous internet usage with collusion detection. In *Proceedings of the Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES'02)*. ACM, 91–102.
- SAKAI, R., OHGISHI, K., AND KASAHARA, M. 2000. Cryptosystems based on pairing. In *Proceedings of the Symposium on Cryptography and Information Security (SCIS'00)*.
- SETH, A. AND KESHAV, S. 2005. Practical security for disconnected nodes. In *Proceedings of the IEEE ICNP Workshop on Secure Network Protocols (NPSec'05)*. IEEE Computer Society, 31–36.
- SHAMIR, A. 1979. How to share a secret. *Comm. ACM* 22, 11, 612–613.
- SYVERSON, P., TSUDIK, G., REED, M., AND LANDWEHR, C. 2000. Towards an analysis of onion routing security. In *Proceedings of the Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies: Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability*. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2009, Springer, 96–114.
- TOR PROJECT. 2008. Tor: Anonymity online. <https://www.torproject.org/>.
- VERHEUL, E. 2001. Evidence that XTR is more secure than supersingular elliptic curve cryptosystems. In *Proceedings of the International Cryptology Conference, Advances in Cryptology (Eurocrypt'01)*. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2045, Springer, 195–210.

Received February 2008; revised February 2009; accepted February 2009